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AIMING STRAIGHT: THE USE OF INDIGENOUS
CUSTOMARY LAW TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS
Meghana RaoRane†
Abstract: Globalization has led to the propagation of traditional cultural
expressions of indigenous peoples outside their communities. Consequently, the question
of how these expressions should be protected has acquired heightened significance.
Commentators have proposed using existing intellectual property regimes and sui generis
solutions. This Comment advocates a third solution, the use of indigenous customary
laws of indigenous peoples to protect their particular traditional cultural expressions.
Indigenous customary laws ensure effective protection of the traditional cultural
expressions of indigenous peoples. The assumption that existing intellectual property
regimes provide the only available protection is erroneous and constrains the
development of effective solutions. Western intellectual property based regimes are
incompatible with the goals underlying the protection of traditional cultural expressions
and give rise to ineffectual solutions. However, indigenous customary law is law, and it
is satisfactorily being used by communities to protect their expressions. It is a flexible
solution in that communities can apply their particular customary laws to protect their
cultural expressions. This Comment concedes that the application of indigenous
customary laws will encounter challenges related to implementation. However, a true
desire to protect the traditional cultural expressions of indigenous peoples can fuel the
discovery of viable solutions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, John Bulun Bulun, an Australian Aboriginal artist, created a
painting titled Magpie Geese and Waterlilies at the Waterhole.1 The painting
incorporated images sacred to his clan (the Ganalbingu people),2 and he
created it with the clan’s consent and according to its traditional laws and
customs.3 Under Ganalbingu customary law,4 Mr. Bulun Bulun could use
his artwork in restricted ways depending on the mode and purpose of
†

I would like to thank Professor Joel Ngugi for his invaluable guidance and Jonathan Franklin and
the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their advice and direction throughout this process. I
would especially like to thank my husband Reza Behforooz for his unfailing support, my parents for their
endless confidence in me, and without whom this endeavor would never have begun, and my sisters for
their love and encouragement.
1
Terri Janke, Minding Culture: Case-Studies on Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural
Expressions, Case Study 3, at 51-52 (2003), available at http://wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/mindingculture/studies/finalstudy.pdf .
2
The Ganalbingu people live traditional lifestyles on land near the Arafura Swamp, which is
situated in Arhem Land in the Northern Territory of Australia. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS
NATIVE CULTURE 44 (2003); see also IDIDJ Australia, A Flower in the Swamp – the Life of Daphne
Danyawarra, http://www.ididj.com.au/education/profiles/banyawarra.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
3
Janke, supra note 1, at 51.
4
This Comment argues in Part V.B. that indigenous customary law is indeed law.
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reproduction.5 Accordingly, he sold the painting to the Maningrida Arts and
Crafts Centre, which resold it to the Northern Territory Museum of Arts and
Science.6 Mr. Bulun Bulun also gave his permission to reproduce the
painting in a book about Australia’s living heritage.7 Roughly eight years
later, he learned that a modified version of his painting8 had been
incorporated into some fabric.9 The fabric, which was to be used to make
uniforms, was produced without his consent.10
As a result, Mr. Bulun Bulun and a high ranking Ganalbingu member
(on behalf of the clan) sued the textile company that had produced the
fabric.11 Mr. Bulun Bulun claimed that the textile company had infringed
his copyright in the painting under Australia’s Copyright Act of 1968.12 The
clan on the other hand claimed that it was the equitable owner of the
copyright in the painting, or alternatively, that the artist’s copyright created
fiduciary obligations in favor of the clan.13 Mr. Bulun Bulun obtained
injunctions to prevent future infringement of his work because the
defendants admitted to breaching his copyright.14 However, the clan’s claim
was dismissed.15 The clan argued that the Ganalbingu people “are the
traditional owners of the body of ritual knowledge from which the artistic
work is derived, including the subject matter of the artistic work and the
artistic work itself.”16 According to the clan, the painting depicted sacred17
knowledge concerning one of the two most important cultural sites for the
Ganalbingu people, located in Ganalbingu country.18 Moreover, under
Ganalbingu customary law, the ownership of the land was tied to a
responsibility to create accompanying cultural expressions.19 Although Mr.
Bulun Bulun was entrusted by his clan with the sacred duty to create
images,20 the unauthorized reproduction and misuse of the artwork interfered
with the relationship among the Ganalbingu people, their ancestors, and
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

See Janke, supra note 1, at 56.
See id. at 51.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 53.
See id.
Id. at 51.
See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244-246.
Id.
See id.
See Janke, supra note 1, at 51-53.
Id. at 54.
See BROWN, supra note 2, at 44-45.
See Janke, supra note 1, at 54.
See id. at 54.
BROWN, supra note 2, at 44.
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their land, and threatened the stability of their society.21 In addition, the
image had certain secret aspects to it, which necessitated controlling its
reproduction. Mr. Bulun Bulun explained that his painting “has all the
inside [secret] meaning of our ceremony, law and custom encoded in it. . . .
To produce [the painting] without strict observance of the law governing its
production diminishes its importance and interferes adversely with the
relationship and trust established between myself, my ancestors, and Barnda
[the long-neck tortoise, a creator being].”22 Thus, the clan suffered harm as
a result of the infringement. In dismissing the clan’s complaint, the court
found that the clan and the artist did not share an equitable interest in the
painting because they were not joint authors as required by Australian
copyright law.23 However, the court found that a fiduciary duty did exist
between the artist and the clan, and if the artist had failed to protect the
work, the clan could have brought legal action against the textile company.24
Because Mr. Bulun Bulun had taken action to protect the painting, in this
case, the clan had no need for a remedy.25
Cases such as Mr. Bulun Bulun’s raise important questions regarding
the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples26 with respect to
expressions of their traditional culture. Issues surrounding the adequate
protection of traditional cultural expressions (“TCEs”)27 have been raised in
Australia and around the world.28 Some resultant questions include whether
communities own the cultural expressions, whether the cultural expressions
should be owned at all, and if so, how they can best be protected. As the
Bulun Bulun case illustrates, there are gaping holes in the protections
afforded to TCEs by existing Intellectual Property Regimes (“IPRs”).
Disciplines such as copyright, trademark, and trade secret have failed to
provide adequate protection to TCEs. Australia, a country with a large
indigenous population, has confronted these issues, and has taken a leading
stance in their resolution. Australian courts have tried hard to bridge the gap
between the needs of indigenous peoples and the protections current laws
afford their TCEs.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Janke, supra note 1, at 56.
BROWN, supra note 2, at 54.
See id. at 63-64.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 64-65.
See infra Part II.A for an explanation of the term “indigenous peoples.”
See infra Part II.B for an explanation of the term “traditional cultural expressions.”
See generally BROWN, supra note 2.
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This Comment argues that the mainstream solutions proposed for the
protection of TCEs, namely the use of existing IPRs and sui generis29
solutions, are sub-optimal, and the indigenous customary laws of the
communities seeking protection are more effective and should be
implemented instead. This proposal is especially relevant in the Australian
context given that Australia has led the way in dealing with the concerns of
indigenous communities30 and is more likely to consider the adoption of
indigenous customary law in some form as a solution. Thus, although the
issues presented are relevant to indigenous communities across the world,
this Comment uses the Australian experience as a springboard for its
proposal. Part II of this Comment introduces the terms “indigenous
peoples” and TCEs. It also describes certain attributes of TCEs that impact
their protection. Part III relates the mechanisms proposed for the protection
of TCEs in mainstream literature and addresses their limitations, and Part IV
presents significant developments relevant to TCEs in Australian law.
Consequently, Part V of this Comment argues that the application of
indigenous customary law is the ideal mechanism for the protection of
TCEs. Indigenous customary law is indeed law, and it has been used
effectively to provide the types of protections indigenous peoples desire.
However, the mainstream approaches proposed for the protection of TCEs
are based upon the occidental notion that existing IPRs exhaust all means of
providing protection. This notion is fallacious and limiting, and does not
account for the differences between TCEs and other forms of intellectual
property. It leads to solutions that over-reach or under-reach in the
protections they afford, resulting in an ultimate denial of protection.
Accordingly, the ideal way to protect the TCEs of indigenous peoples is to
travel outside the epistemic discourse produced by the occidental intellectual
property regime and allow for a form of protection that has worked for
indigenous communities—the enforcement of the indigenous customary
laws that have always governed the fate of their TCEs. Part VI of this
Comment argues that the challenges of effectively implementing indigenous
customary law are no more difficult to surmount than those encountered in
the implementation of other regimes of protection. Finally, Part VI also puts
forth some solutions to the implementation-related concerns.

29

Defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “Of its own kind or class; unique or particular.” BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999).
30
See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; see also discussion infra Part IV (providing
an overview of Australian law in this regard).
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ TCES ARE THEIR LIVING CULTURAL HERITAGE
AND PRESENT UNIQUE PROBLEMS FOR PROTECTION

Widely accepted definitions for the terms “indigenous peoples” and
“TCEs” do not exist, and yet, there are certain commonalities among the
existing definitions which provide an adequate basis for understanding them.
Indigenous peoples are the living descendents of the pre-invasion inhabitants
of lands now dominated by others and who were subject to some form of a
colonizing experience.31 TCEs, on the other hand, constitute all forms of the
living and evolving cultural creations of a community, and possess certain
attributes that raise unique issues regarding their protection.32
A.

The Term “Indigenous Peoples” Is Highly Debated Upon, but
Encompasses Certain Undisputed Aspects

“Indigenous peoples” refers “broadly to the [culturally distinctive
communities of the] living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands
now dominated by others.”33 This Comment adopts the above definition
because it is fairly expansive. The attempt to define indigenous peoples has
been controversial.34 Some states have challenged the need for a definition,
while others have found it necessary.35 Indigenous people themselves have
expressed concerns regarding the idea of a formal definition for fear of
excluding groups that are not encompassed by the definition.36 In addition,
there has been debate about the use of the term “peoples” due to its
association with the right of self-determination.37 Regardless, bodies like
the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the World
31
See S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 13 (2004).
32
See generally Kamal Puri, Protection of Traditional Culture and Folklore,
http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/Unesco/puri.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (discussing “folklore” and
the current regimes available for its protection).
33
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2004).
34
See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and
Indigenous Resources in International Law, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 5, 8-9 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2004);
see also Jeremy Firestone & Jonathan Lilley, Isabel Torres de Noronha, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights,
and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
219, 223-231 (2005) (examining the term “indigenous peoples” and discussing their relevance in
international environmental law).
35
See Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 8; see also Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1998)
(discussing controversies surrounding the term “indigenous”).
36
Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 8-9; see Kingsbury, supra note 35, at 421-424.
37
Stoll & von Hahn, supra note 34, at 12.
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Bank38 have attempted to formulate a definition. Although all the definitions
differ from each other, certain commonalities exist—such as cultural
distinctiveness, self-identification, the experience of subjugation, and an
occupation of the land prior to outside settlers—that are significant to an
understanding the term “indigenous peoples.”39 In Australia, the term refers
primarily to the Aboriginal people of the mainland who arrived from
Southeast Asia and have lived in Australia for at least forty thousand years.40
It also refers to the Torres Strait Islanders who arrived at the Torres Strait
Islands more recently, probably from Papua New Guinea.41
B.

The Term “Traditional Cultural Expressions” Is Expansive and It
Constitutes the Living Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples

The terms “traditional cultural expressions”, “expressions of
folklore,” “indigenous culture,” and “intangible and tangible cultural
heritage,” are all used to refer to the traditional cultural creations of a
community, notwithstanding a debate on their propriety and validity.42 Since
the term TCE is free of any negative connotations other terms may imply43
and is used by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”),44 this
Comment will refer to the subject matter constituting the traditional cultural
creations of indigenous peoples as TCEs. No single, widely accepted
definition of TCEs exists,45 and despite valid concerns over the lack of a

38

See id. at 9-11.
See id. at 11; see also Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes,
on the Concept of "Indigenous People," Sub Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996) (discussing factors relevant to the
understanding of the concept of “indigenous”).
40
See Justice Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 711, 713-714 (2003).
41
See id.
42
Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, at Annex 2,
Annex 17, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3 (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/
en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_3.pdf; see also Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property in the
Dreamtime—Protecting the Cultural Creativity of Indigenous Peoples, OIPRC ELECTRONIC J. INTELL.
PROP. RTS. Section 1(a) (1999), http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP1199.pdf.
43
The term “folklore” in particular has been criticized for implying an association with less
developed societies and for its seemingly copyright-centric and Western bias. See Global Intellectual
Property Rights: Boundaries of Access and Enforcement, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting
Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
753, 757 (2002); see also Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 259, 262 (Silke von
Lewinski ed., 2004).
44
Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42,
at Annex 18.
45
See id. at Annex 17-18.
39
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consistent definition,46 the existing definitions, being sufficiently
expansive,47 will suffice for this Comment. For example, a working
description of TCEs set forth by the WIPO and the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) Model
Provisions recognizes them as “productions consisting of characteristic
elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a
community . . . or by individuals reflecting traditional artistic expectations of
such a community.”48
In addition, the Model Provisions encompass four types of
expressions that are considered TCEs:49 1) verbal expressions (folktales,
folk poetry and riddles), 2) musical expressions (folksongs and instrumental
music), 3) expressions by actions (dances, plays and artistic forms or
rituals), and 4) tangible expressions (productions of various types of folk art,
crafts, musical instruments, and architectural forms). Various other
definitions constructed in the same expansive vein abound, and some are
country-specific.50 A noteworthy characteristic of TCEs is that they are
living and constantly evolving.51 The story underlying Mr. Bulun Bulun’s
artwork constitutes a TCE as it is a manifestation of a form of traditional
culture, contains elements of the artistic heritage of the Ganalbingu people,
and is living and evolving due to its continued significance and application
within the community.
C.

Traditional Cultural Expressions Have Certain Distinct Attributes that
Raise Unique Issues with Respect to Their Protection

Certain attributes of TCEs distinguish them from other expressions of
culture and raise unique issues regarding their protection. TCEs are based
on traditions, associated with indigenous groups, and may be practiced in a
traditional manner.52 They are usually conveyed orally, visually, by
46
See Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property Law Protection for Traditional and Sacred “Folklife
Expressions”: Will Remedies Become Available to Cultural Authors and Communities, 6 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 99, 101 (1998).
47
See Jonathan Blavin, Folklore in Africa, section I, Jan. 8, 2003, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
openeconomies/okn/folklore.html.
48
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org. (UNESCO)/World Intell. Prop. Org.
(WIPO), Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions 9-10 (1985).
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A
Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 769, 778 (1999).
51
Puri, supra note 32, at Introduction.
52
Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42,
at Annex 18-19.
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imitation, or in performance, implying that the written tradition is less
significant for TCEs.53 The ownership rights of TCEs are based on
communal notions, where the community owns the cultural expressions
passed down by its ancestors, and no individual member has the authority to
alienate them.54 Certain forms of TCEs passed down over generations may
be used by individuals in the community in creative ways, leading to a
“dynamic interplay between collective and individual creativity” and the
production of countless variations of the TCE.55 Thus, although the
expressions of TCEs may be tangible, intangible, or a combination of the
two, the underlying traditional culture is usually intangible, and a separation
of the two aspects has been compared to a separation of the body and the
soul, and is artificial.56 In addition, TCEs are based on traditions that have
existed for long periods of time, often longer than the terms of protections
offered by existing IPRs. Thus, questions arise regarding whether they
should receive legal protection at all.57 Certain forms of TCEs are
considered sacred by the communities in which they exist, and knowledge of
them by those unauthorized to know, as well as use of the knowledge in an
unauthorized manner, leads to their desecration.58 Finally, TCEs can be
misappropriated59 and serve as fodder for artistic inspiration to people
outside the indigenous community, resulting in imitation and misuse of the
culture.60
III.

MAINSTREAM SOLUTIONS PROPOSED
ARE INADEQUATE

FOR THE

PROTECTION

OF

TCES

Most efforts to protect TCEs have tended toward using existing IPRs
and sui generis solutions. Although these solutions at first glance seem
capable of adequately protecting TCEs, there are severe limitations inherent
in them, and as such, they fail to constitute satisfactory solutions.
53

Puri, supra note 32, at Introduction.
See Blavin, supra note 47, at section II.A.
55
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (“WIPO”), The Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised Objectives and Principles, at Annex 13, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/4, (Apr. 8, 2005), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_8/wipo_
grtkf_ic_8_4.pdf.
56
See Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note
42, at Annex 18.
57
See id. at 7.
58
Brown, supra note 2, at 54.
59
See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural
Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 310-11 (2002).
60
Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note 42,
at Annex 19.
54
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Existing Intellectual Property Regimes Provide Inadequate Protection

Existing IPRs are well developed, and yet, they fail to satisfactorily
protect TCEs. The laws that constitute existing IPRs are flexible and apply
to a wide range of issues. However, they fall short of protecting TCEs due
to their multiple requirements and misaligned foundations relative to TCEs.
1.

The Numerous and Incompatible Requirements of Copyright Law
Limit Its Ability to Protect TCEs

The philosophical premise underlying copyright law, one existing IPR
proposed as a solution to protect TCEs, has been described as utilitarian,
where the “purpose of copyright is to stimulate production of the widest
possible variety of creative goods at the lowest possible price.”61 Copyright
law is associated with the common law world and can trace its roots to
England.62 The Crown wanted to control the first printing establishment
founded in 1476, for both economic and political reasons.63 It thus granted
exclusive rights to some to publish certain books.64 Years later in 1709, the
Statute of Anne was enacted.65 It was the world’s first copyright statute and
was entitled, “An Act of the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during
the Times therein mentioned.”66 It gave the Stationers, the group that held
monopoly over publishing at that time, the continued right to destroy
unauthorized and unlicensed works, while entitling anyone to obtain a
copyright for a limited term.67 Thus, the Act “encouraged learning” by
providing authors or publishers limited term copyrights.68 Similarly, in
France, sovereign printing privileges existed, but they ended with the French
revolution.69 Laws were passed in 1791 and 1793 which gave authors rights
in their works.70 The English and French laws formed the basis of future
copyright laws and thus fixed the rights of economic exploitation.71 Other
nations then began developing their own copyright laws.72 Australian
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 3 (2001).
See id.
See id. at 5.
See id.
1 Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright Law and Practice § 2.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 5.
See id. at 5-6.
See id.
Id. at 8.
See id.
See GELLER, supra note 65, at §2.
See generally id. (discussing the historical rise of copyright).
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copyright law is based on the copyright law of England.73 When the United
Kingdom (“UK”) enacted a new copyright act in 1911, Australia adopted it
by passing the Copyright Act of 1912.74 Today, Australian copyright law is
governed by The Copyright Act of 1968.75 It too was influenced by the
copyright laws of the UK, specifically, the 1956 UK Act.76 Thus historically,
economic and property development, as well as the cultural development of
the state, have been the predominant considerations in the formation of
copyright law.77 Economic rights and protections have been given to authors
in exchange for the creation of intellectual works that will eventually fall
into the public domain, thereby enriching the state’s cultural heritage.78
Therefore, the purpose of copyright is to balance the author’s rights against
the state’s goal of disseminating intellectual creations.79
This common underlying purpose of copyright law results in certain
basic criteria for copyright protection which can be generalized despite the
differing copyright laws across nations. All copyright laws require some
form of creativity or originality to prevent the slavish copying of works.80
Additional requirements, such as “skill and knowledge,” “nontrivial
variation,” “the imprint of personality,” or “individuality,” may also be
applied.81 Some copyright laws require works to be fixed in a tangible form,
while others presuppose works to be embodied in a perceptible form, and do
not require fixation.82 Rights to control derivative works also exist.83
Finally, in most countries, works can be protected for limited terms only.84
Due to the requirements copyright law imposes and its underlying
premises, copyright law cannot adequately protect TCEs. First, copyright
73
See generally COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, CROWN COPYRIGHT 20-24 (2005), available
at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~6+
APRIL+full+version+crown+copyright.pdf/$file/6+APRIL+full+version+crown+copyright.pdf (discussing
the development of copyright law in Australia).
74
See id. at 22-23.
75
See Attorney General’s Office, Copyright Law in Australia 5, http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/
rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~Copyright+Law+in+Australia+-+A+
Short+Guide+-+June+2005.pdf/$file/Copyright+Law+in+Australia+-+A+Short+Guide+-+June+2005.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
76
See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 73, at 23-24.
77
See Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 297-98 (1994).
78
See id.
79
Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 185 (2000).
80
GELLER, supra note 65, § 2[c][i].
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 230-236.
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law is based on the concept of individuality, and it confers rights on
individual and joint authors.85 However, due to the constantly evolving
nature of TCEs, attribution to individual or joint authors within indigenous
communities is not possible.86 Moreover, ownership rights in indigenous
communities are complex and nuanced,87 and indigenous authors are subject
to complex communal regulations.88
The court in Bulun Bulun
acknowledged these intricate rights, as explained in Mr. Bulun Bulun’s
affidavit which stated that:
I am permitted by my law to create this artwork, but it is also
my duty and responsibility to create such words, as part of my
traditional Aboriginal land ownership obligation. A painting
such as this is not separate from my rights in my land. It is a
part of my bundle of rights in the land and must be produced in
accordance with Ganalbingu custom and law.89
Similarly, another Australian Aboriginal artist whose artwork had been
misappropriated explained:
As an artist whilst I may own the copyright in a particular
artwork under western law, under Aboriginal law I must not use
an image or story in such a way as to undermine the rights of all
the other Yolngu (her clan) who have an interest whether direct
or indirect in it. In this way I hold the image on trust for all the
other Yolngu with an interest in the story.90
Thus, indigenous authors do not own their creations in the ways that Western
authors do. Yet, Western notions of individual and joint authorship continue
to exist as preconditions to copyright protection, and as a result, indigenous
peoples cannot adequately protect their TCEs using copyright law.
Second, copyright law provides a limited duration for protection.91
Many TCEs have existed and evolved for many generations.92 Because
copyright law provides protection for only a limited period, it cannot
85

See Silke von Lewinski, The Protection of Folklore, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 757

(2003).
86

See id. at 757-758.
See, e.g., PETER SUTTON, NATIVE TITLE IN AUSTRALIA: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, 111-34
(2003) (highlighting the complexity of Aboriginal land title, which is inextricably entwined with the TCEs
of Aboriginal peoples in Australia).
88
See WIPO, supra note 42, at Annex 36.
89
Bulun Bulun, supra note 12, at 250.
90
See Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. and Others (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240.
91
See von Lewinski, supra note 85, at 759.
92
See Sackville, supra note 40, at 725-26.
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adequately protect the long lasting and continuously evolving TCEs.93
Third, copyright law requires some form of originality.94 Because TCEs
have existed for long periods of time and have likely already fallen into the
public domain, the small changes they are subject to as a result of their
evolution are not likely to fulfill the originality requirement.95 Fourth, some
countries require “fixation” of the material sought to be protected.96 Even
when the culture is “fixed” in a form adequate to meet the copyright
requirements, which may not always occur, because TCEs constantly evolve,
newer forms or versions not yet fixed will not be eligible for protection.97
Therefore, copyright law either imposes very narrow requirements or does
not impose any requirements in areas where TCEs need protection.
2.

Trade Secret Law Cannot Protect TCEs Because of Its Commercial
Basis

Trade secret law, another mainstream IPR proposed as a solution for
protecting TCEs, attempts to protect valuable commercial information that
has been conveyed in confidence.98 A trade secret is a piece of information
that has commercial value, is necessary to carry out the business of the
organization, and is conveyed to employees or others in confidence.99 The
owner of the trade secret is required to have made reasonable efforts to
protect it.100 However, trade secrets may be protected indefinitely.101
Despite its seemingly expansive range of protection, trade secret law
cannot satisfactorily protect TCEs of indigenous peoples. At first glance,
this body of law may be considered useful to protect sacred or secret
TCEs.102 However, it requires that the information protected be of a
commercial nature, which is not always the case with TCEs. Moreover, it
only protects information so long as it is not already public, and many TCEs
do not meet this criterion.103 Finally, it provides remedies only once the
93

See id.
See von Lewinski, supra note 85, at 758.
95
See id. at 758-59.
96
See id. at 759.
97
Id.
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Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving
Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
633, 665 (2003).
99
See id. at 665-66.
100
See Michael Hassemer, Genetic Resources, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 151, 176 (Silke von
Lewinski ed., 2004).
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See id.
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secret has been disclosed. Many TCEs are secret and sacred and their very
disclosure to the uninitiated violates their sanctity.104 Therefore, providing a
remedy after the expression has been disclosed and the damage done does
not satisfactorily protect the TCE.
3.

Trademarks, Certification Marks, Geographic Indicators Provide
Limited Protections and Cannot Protect TCEs

Trademark law, the third mainstream IPR proposed to protect TCEs,
identifies the source of goods, and protects commercial investment in
symbols, names, and other indicators of source.105 Other protective marks
with similar functions also exist. Collective trademarks identify the source
of products or services of the members of a group.106 Certification marks
guarantee that the associated product or service has certain qualities,107 while
geographic indicators identify the territory from which a product originates,
and indicate the existence of a characteristic associated with that territory.108
Thus, trademarks, certification marks, and geographic indicators serve as a
stamp of authenticity and an indicator of source for consumers.
While these marks can provide some valuable protections for TCEs,
they cannot provide the thorough protection TCEs require. Although
trademarks and geographic indicators serve well as indicators of source and
authenticity, the protections they provide do not extend to the actual
expression of the TCEs.109 Similarly, certifications marks suffer from this
same limitation of trademarks and geographic indicators. In addition, the
effective use of these marks by indigenous groups is barred by practical
limitations such as the financial investment involved and a lack of
knowledge of how to best use them.110
B.

Sui Generis Solutions Are More Progressive in the Protections They
Provide but Still Have Implicit Limitations

Sui generis solutions are approaches that create new intellectual
property categories for the protection of TCEs.111 They aim to protect TCEs
104

See, e.g., Sackville, supra note 40, at 724-25.
See Paterson & Karjala, supra note 98, at 666.
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107
See id. at 308.
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111
See Daniel Wuger, Prevention of Misappropriation of Intangible Cultural Heritage Through
Intellectual Property Laws, in POOR PEOPLES KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 183, 191 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004).
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by working in conjunction with existing IPRs or by replacing them.112
Although most countries have created and implemented sui generis solutions
within their copyright laws, some have established them as stand-alone
IP-like systems.113 Some sui generis solutions recognize and incorporate
indigenous customary laws within their mechanisms of protection.114
Examples of sui generis systems include the Tunis Model Law on Copyright,
the Model Provisions, the Bangui Agreement of OAPI, the Panama Law No.
20, and the South Pacific Model Law for National Laws.115
Although sui generis solutions afford greater protections to TCEs
when compared with existing IPRs, they still fall short of providing an
adequate level of protection. Some sui generis solutions take a step in the
right direction by incorporating indigenous customary laws, and thus,
recognize the ability of indigenous customary laws to provide adequate
protection to TCEs.116 However, as discussed below, sui generis solutions
are based on existing IPRs, and therefore suffer from many of the same
limitations of existing IPRs.117 It has also been suggested that sui generis
solutions have no more than a regional reach and that the WIPO-UNESCO
Model Provision, for instance, has become “de-facto, a strictly regional
instrument.”118
IV.

AUSTRALIA HAS TAKEN
PROTECTION OF TCES

A

PROGRESSIVE APPROACH

TO

THE

While colonial Australia did little to protect indigenous peoples’
rights, the country has made significant changes through its developing
body of indigenous law.120 The government has paid attention to the issue of
119
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See Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, supra note
42, at Annex 34.
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visited Apr. 7, 2006).
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145 (2001).
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indigenous rights for at least the last twenty years through the establishment
of committees and working groups and by commissioning various reports to
deal with the concerns of indigenous peoples.121 However, the development
of Australian case law with respect to indigenous peoples’ rights has been
significant. In this regard, the Mabo122 decision of the Australian High Court
is an especially momentous one in the development of indigenous rights in
Australia.123
In contrast with the United States, where the colonizers entered into
treaties with the Native Americans, British colonial powers in Australia
considered the land uninhabited, with no prior claims other than their
own.124 Therefore, the issue of treaties is connected to the question of land
title,125 which in turn has significant implications with respect to cultural
expressions.126 In Mabo, the Australian High Court overturned a law that
extinguished native land titles in the Torres Strait Islands on the grounds that
the traditional owners had a “compelling common law claim to their land by
right of ancestral occupation.”127 As a result, the government has the burden
of proof to show that there are no prior occupants on land it claims or that
the traditional occupants have abandoned the land.128 The case was
significant in many ways, one of which was that the court acknowledged that
indigenous laws and customs gave rise to native title, and thus native laws
and customs were part of Australian Law.129
A sampling of other Australian cases illustrates the courts’ trend of
acknowledging indigenous customary law. In Foster v. Mountford,130 the
court restricted publication of a book it deemed “magnificent” because the
Aboriginal people whose sacred and confidential information was presented
in the book (and had been shared with the author in confidence) would suffer
damage if the uninitiated became privy to the information contained
within.131 In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank,132 an Aboriginal artist’s design of a
Morning Star Pole was reproduced on a banknote. The court, among other
121
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123
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things, observed that current law may be inadequate to recognize the claims
of aboriginal communities to regulate the use of works that are “essentially
communal in origin.”133 Finally, in the Bulun Bulun case discussed
previously, the court opened up the possibility that the creation of an express
trust between an artist and his or her community, or a third party’s knowing
involvement in a copyright owners breach of fiduciary duty towards his or
her community, might allow the community to succeed against a third party
for copyright infringement.134 Thus, Australian courts have recognized the
interests of indigenous communities and the lack of adequate safeguards to
protect their culture, while identifying possible means of protection in future
cases.
These developments indicate that Australia has begun to acknowledge
indigenous customary law in a significant manner. Although indigenous
customary law has not yet been directly applied to protect TCEs in
Australian courts, it is being given serious consideration as a possible basis
for protection. Australian courts have acknowledged that under the right
circumstances, the application of indigenous customary law might indeed be
appropriate. Therefore, the leap from where the law is today to the
application of indigenous customary law for the protection of TCEs might
not be a very large one.
V.

INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAWS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE,
UNLIKE OTHER REGIMES, THEY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION

The preceding discussion shows that existing IPRs provide ineffective
resolutions to the problem of protecting TCEs; therefore, another solution—
the application of indigenous customary law135 of indigenous peoples—
should be implemented. The application of indigenous customary law is the
most effective resolution, given the inadequacies of solutions based on
incompatible Western ideals of intellectual property protection. The
assumption that existing IPRs alone can protect intellectual property is
erroneous and ultimately constrains the solutions proposed for protecting
TCEs. Indigenous customary law is law that has been used satisfactorily by
indigenous peoples.136 It is a flexible solution, in that the indigenous
customary law of each diverse indigenous group around the world can be
applied to that group to protect its own TCEs. Mainstream solutions
133
134
135
136

See Sackville, supra note 40, at 739.
See id. at 744.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
Id.
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(existing IPRs and sui generis solutions) are based on a Western intellectual
property paradigm which fundamentally differs from the notions underlying
the need to protect TCEs. This causes mainstream solutions to either overreach or under-reach in the protections they afford, leading to a denial of
protection for TCEs. Thus, they are sub-optimal as solutions, and the
application of indigenous customary law is a more effective resolution.
A.

The Presumption that Existing IPRs Exhaust All Possible Means of
Effective Protection Is Fallacious and Limiting

A belief that existing IPRs, on which sui generis solutions are based,
provide the only avenue to protect cultural expressions is misleading and
handicaps the goal of achieving effective protection for TCEs. Intellectual
property has been described as “nothing more than a socially-recognized, but
imaginary, set of fences and gates” that “[p]eople must believe . . . for it to
be effective.”137 Existing IPRs, which are based on Western intellectual
property ideals, are so well established today that most of the world has
accepted their set of defined “gates and fences.” For instance, the 149
member nations138 of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) have agreed to
ensure that their laws conform to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement.139 The TRIPS agreement enforces
the basic precepts of Western intellectual property protection, such as
copyright, on all the member nations of the WTO.140 In essence, 149 nations
have accepted Western intellectual property ideals and are in the process of
implementing them. Amid this widespread confirmation, it is easy to forget
that existing IPRs are no more than one convention of protection, rather than
the only possible convention. It has been proposed that “the tradition which
attracts the most adherence will be the one . . . [that] is the most
persuasive.”141 Existing IPRs can thus be seen just a predominant paradigm
of protection that most of the world has affirmed and considers persuasive.
137
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996).
138
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. The WTO had 149
members as of December 11, 2005.
139
See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Intellectual Property:
Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm. Since the
TRIPS agreement took effect in January 1995, member nations were given a time schedule to ensure that
their laws conformed with the agreement.
140
See generally id. The TRIPS agreement among other things seeks to “encourage[ ] creation and
invention” for the benefit of society and “contribute to technological innovation and the transfer of
technology”—all of which are principles underlying Western intellectual property ideals.
141
See H. PATRICK GLEN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 37 (2000).
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Despite the widespread acceptance of existing IPRs, other regimes of
protection based on different underlying philosophies continue to exist and
may be better suited to protecting TCEs. The application of the distinct
indigenous customary laws of indigenous peoples for the protection of their
particular TCEs is one such regime. These laws have proved satisfactory to
the indigenous groups that apply them and should be considered seriously.
Ignoring other regimes and imposing predominantly Western-ideal based
solutions upon cultures extraneous to those ideals does not allow for an
accounting of the differences between the needs of the various cultures
seeking protections. Because many of these differences fall outside the
scope of Western based regimes of protection, the protection achievable for
TCEs remains limited.
Australia acknowledged the existence and
applicability of indigenous customary laws in a significant way when it
linked indigenous customs and laws with native land title.142 Moreover,
while Australian courts are mindful of the existence of indigenous customary
laws and have often taken them into account to varying degrees in their
decisions, they continue to analyze the problem of protecting TCEs largely
within the framework of existing IPRs. For instance, the Ganalbingu clan’s
claim was dismissed in Bulun Bulun because the clan had no applicable
rights under existing IPRs. Thus, the clan received no remedy despite
having valid ownership of the artwork under indigenous customary law.
One of the Justices of the High Court of Australia acknowledged these
limitations:
Difficulties with extending Australia’s intellectual property law
to the styles and nuances of the artistic creations of Aboriginal
and other indigenous people of Australia suggest that there may
be a need to look specifically at the express adaptation of that
law to the needs of indigenous peoples so that the law can
respond to the problem and not simply impose its view of what
the problem is upon all people uniformly.143
Thus, the application of existing IPRs, and to a certain extent sui generis
solutions based on them, to the protection of TCEs “imposes [a Western
world] view of what the problem is upon all people uniformly”144 and thus,
fails to respond with an effective solution.
142
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Indigenous Customary Law Is Law and Constitutes a Satisfactory and
Flexible Solution that Will Provide Effective Protection to TCEs

Indigenous customary law refers to the “body of rules, values and
traditions accepted in traditional . . . societies as establishing standards and
procedures to be followed and upheld.”145 Indigenous peoples often have
their own set of traditions and practices that have evolved over the years and
constitute their customary law.146 Indigenous customary law transforms over
time to account for the changes in the needs of the peoples it seeks to
govern.147 It derives its legitimacy from social acceptance by the members
of the community it governs148 and is based on norms that may be
understood only by members of the community.149 Communities may
possess institutional structures and mechanisms to implement and enforce
their laws.150 Indigenous customary law is so entwined with the way of life
of indigenous peoples, and is such an integral part of their culture, that it has,
independent of the customs it governs, been claimed to be deserving of
protection as an element of the culture.151 Indigenous customary law has
also governed the use of TCEs in indigenous communities. It determines
who in the community is authorized to permit their use and reproduction.152
Thus, indigenous customary law focuses on a “bundle of relationships rather
than [the] bundle of economic rights,” which Western intellectual property
laws emphasize.153 In addition, it focuses on community ownership and
involvement rather than on personal rights.154 Under Aboriginal law in
Australia, the right to use a clan’s symbols and stories resides in the
traditional owners, who are considered custodians of the images.155 The
traditional owners collectively determine whether and how the clan’s images
can be used.156 Unfortunately, indigenous customary law is often viewed as
145
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subordinate to other more prevalent legal traditions, and has not been
accorded the legitimacy that those traditions enjoy. 157
Indigenous customary law is law although it might not conform with
Western notions of what constitutes law.158 Max Gluckman, a social
anthropologist who has studied indigenous peoples, has found that systems
of law do indeed exist in indigenous societies.159 While addressing the
question of what law is, Gluckman argues that “we must accept that all
words which deal with important social facts [such as law] are bound to have
many meanings,” and that “it is sterile . . . to argue that such words can only
be applied in one sense and not in another.”160 Therefore, law must be
thought of more expansively than Western notions of what constitutes law.
Law can be thought of as “the process of social control by which any society
maintains order and discourages disorder.”161
Because indigenous
customary law is a body of rules that establishes standards and procedures
within a community,162 it is indeed law and has been recognized as such to a
limited extent. In European colonies, where native and European courts
functioned in parallel, European courts applied native law in exceptional
cases.163 The Australian High Court in Mabo recognized indigenous
customary law and bolstered its significance by using it as a basis for land
title.164
Indigenous customary law has satisfactorily governed the use of
TCEs, and is flexible enough to protect the diverse cultural expressions of
indigenous communities around the world. Indigenous customary law
continues to exist today. Various Australian court decisions can be found
where questions relating to indigenous customary law have arisen.165 In
some cases, such as Bulun Bulun and Yumbulul, claims based on indigenous
customary law were even made. However, because there are large numbers
157
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of diverse indigenous groups across the world, no single indigenous position
on the issue of folkloric protection exists.166 Hence, a single solution cannot
ensue. The application of community-specific indigenous customary law
allows for a flexible solution that rejects the one-size-fits all approach.
Australian courts have often struggled to understand the significance of
TCEs to indigenous communities while attempting to fashion fair solutions.
Misunderstandings about the needs of indigenous communities often result
from efforts by outsiders to comprehend the role of TCEs in a community.167
Because the principles underlying the protection of TCEs are embodied in
the indigenous customary laws themselves, their application eliminates the
possibility of misunderstandings that lead to ineffective solutions.
Indigenous peoples have declared that “they want to create a system that is
their own, and not a modification of ‘mainstream’ intellectual property
law.”168 Indigenous people want to take control over their cultural
expressions and define how these expressions can be used.169 The
application of indigenous customary law will allow them to do so.170 It will
also allow them to control the fate and development of their cultures, which
has been argued to be the most effective way to counter forces that threaten
to destroy the customary practices of indigenous peoples.171
C.

Mainstream Forms of Protection Are Sub-Optimal as They Are
Founded Upon an Incompatible Western Intellectual Property
Paradigm

Existing IPRs and sui generis systems are rooted in Western concepts
of intellectual property protection which are fundamentally distinct from the
notions underlying the need for protecting TCEs. This gap in the underlying
precept for protection is magnified when an attempt is made to apply the
fundamentally unsuitable IPRs and sui generis systems to TCEs. It results in
misaligned and inadequate solutions that over-reach or under-reach in the
166
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170
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types of protections they provide, as well as unintended consequences,
which ultimately deny TCEs the protections required. Such consequences
cannot be rectified but for a realignment of the subject matter being
protected and the regime used to protect it.
1.

The Western Intellectual Property Paradigm Is Fundamentally
Incompatible with the Impetus to Protect TCEs

Western notions of intellectual property protection that are deeply
entrenched in existing IPRs and sui generis solutions are incompatible in
significant ways with notions underlying the need to protect TCEs.172 In
contrast with other traditions, western European culture, to which existing
IPRs can trace their roots,173 has been thought of as materialistic and
individualistic, placing a great emphasis on the consumption of goods and
resources.174 Eurocentric societies have been identified with certain cultural
attributes that are infused with this materialistic perspective and that color
their thought processes and epistemological values and logic.175 Some
attributes stemming from the Eurocentric perspective that may be at odds
with the cultures of indigenous peoples include analytical thought,
objectification, abstraction, extreme rationalism, and desacralization.176
Eurocentricity is thought to delineate all the outputs of Eurocentric culture,
including the arts, sciences, and even the society’s concept of the law.177
Western notions of intellectual property, anchored in these epistemic
frameworks, provide incentives for the progress of the arts and sciences, and
for the commercialization and dissemination of intellectual works for the
benefit of society. In essence, they are “based on a capitalistic philosophy
designed to serve a market economy.”178 The very idea that intellectual
172
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creations are deserving of individualistic protections akin to property is a
Western world view.179 In fact, the use of the term “intellectual property” to
refer to the culture of indigenous peoples has significant implications
because it requires their culture to be reduced to a list of features, as opposed
to the flourishing and evolving creature that it is.180
There is a chasm between these Western Eurocentric notions that
underline existing IPRs and the notions underlying the need to protect TCEs.
Indigenous societies are built on community-based economies that focus on
collective creations that do not inherit a corresponding right of
alienability.181 One Aboriginal Australian artist, whose artwork was
reproduced without the requisite permission of the clan explained, “[i]t’s like
the Queen and the monarchy. They have their symbols and uniforms and
[they are] passed down through one line of the family. It doesn’t go
anywhere else. That is what Aboriginal art is about.”182 Indigenous peoples
do not believe that consumerism will ultimately benefit humanity.183 The
incentives and rewards of Eurocentric societies do not hold much value
within indigenous culture.184 To indigenous peoples, TCEs are not an art or
a science to be shared or disseminated, but an integral part of daily life with
specified functions. No incentive is required for their creation. Mr. Bulun
Bulun explained, “[m]y ancestors had a responsibility given to them by
Baranda [the creator ancestor] to perform the ceremony and to do the
paintings which were granted to them. This is part of the continuing
responsibility of the traditional Aboriginal owners handed down from
generation to generation.”185 Until recently, TCEs were not commercially
valuable; and even if opportunities for commercial exploitation cease, their
creation will continue. Their inherent value to indigenous communities is in
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their creation and existence. Therefore, a scheme of protection rooted in
providing incentives to create and disseminate is inapplicable to TCEs.
Similarly, sui generis systems, though more expansive in the
protections they avail TCEs, were developed with reference to existing IPRs,
and as a result, have inherent shortcomings as well. The approach to the
creation of sui generis systems can be seen as an effort to patch the holes
exposed when attempts were made to apply existing IPRs to TCEs. Such a
reactionary tactic, meant to address the inadequacies of exiting IPRs, can
hardly result in the most suitable form of protection for TCEs. Ideally,
protection should stem from a proactive, comprehensive evaluation of the
particular needs of a group of people, notwithstanding the existence of other
regimes, including possibly conflicting ones.
A brief examination of some of the sui generis systems in existence
today illustrates their shortfalls. The Panama Law, hailed as a possible
model for protection,186 only covers subject matter capable of commercial
use.187 For example, the rights do not apply when national TCEs are used by
public entities for non-commercial purposes.188 Thus, the needs of TCEs
that have no commercial use, but significance to the communities that need
protection, are not provided for by the law. In addition, the Panama Law
requires registration of TCEs,189 which can defeat the purpose of protection,
especially with regard to expressions that are sacred or secret. The Bangui
Agreement allows the author to be the first holder of economic and moral
rights, and provides for certain collaborative and collective works, yet fails
to incorporate provisions dealing with needs specific to TCEs.190 The Model
Provisions provide for fair use type exceptions. They do not require
authorization to use works for educational purposes, illustrations in original
works, where TCEs are “borrowed” to create an original work, and other
“incidental utilizations.”191 Such exceptions are very valuable within the
context of existing IPRs. However, the provisions can easily defeat the
purpose of protection with regard to certain expressions, especially those
that are sacred or secret. The South Pacific Model Law too provides for fair
use type exceptions and therefore, it has similar shortcomings.192
186
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The Protections Needed for TCEs Cannot Be Addressed by Solutions
Based on Western Intellectual Property Ideals Due to Fundamental
Gaps in the Paradigms of Protection

The fundamental principles underlying existing IPRs and sui generis
solutions are not expansive enough to encompass the protections needed for
TCEs, and consequently, both solutions fall short of providing the necessary
level of protection. Western intellectual property notions are rooted in ideas
based on economic benefit and commercialization. Solutions based on such
concepts cannot capture the cultural significance inherent in the need to
protect TCEs and fail to guarantee systems of cultural perpetuation.193 The
aim of these solutions is misplaced at times and they often miss their mark.
This is not surprising given that concepts such as the protection of sacred
information do not exist in Western intellectual property laws. In Yumbulul
v. Reserve Bank,194 copyright law could not prevent a person outside the
indigenous community from reproducing a sacred Morning Star pole or from
using ideas based on traditional designs.195 Copyright law does not protect
ideas, and yet the ideas sought to be protected were sacred to the clan and
deserving of protection under indigenous customary law. Thus, solutions
based on Western intellectual property ideals cannot account for the various
unique aspects of TCEs when compared with other types of expressions, and
they fall short of providing TCEs with the necessary protections.
3.

Mismatched Paradigms of Protection Cause Solutions Based on
Western Intellectual Property Ideals to Impose Unnecessary
Requirements on TCEs, Further Limiting the Protections Available

Gaps in the bases underlying existing IPRs and sui generis solutions
on the one hand and TCEs on the other hand lead to an imposition of
extraneous and unnecessary requirements for the protection of TCEs, which
are ultimately counter productive. The cultural developments in Europe that
influenced the development of law are not so universal and transcendent that
the law can be lifted out of context and applied successfully to the diverse
cultural traditions of indigenous peoples around the world.196 Yet, Western
legal requirements are applied to TCEs. The result is that TCEs are often
denied protection because they fail to meet the requirements imposed by the
extrinsic laws, such as the requirements of authorship, originality, or fixation
193
194
195
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under copyright law. These requirements are not imposed by the indigenous
peoples themselves and are inconsequential to the type of protection they
desire. Imposing such requirements only leads to the denial of protection of
TCEs. For instance, Mr. Bulun Bulun’s clan was denied an equitable interest
in his painting because under Australian law, equitable interest can be gained
only through joint authorship “defined as a collaboration ‘in which the
contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the other
author.’”197 In precluding clan ownership, the court stated that “[a] person
who supplies an artistic idea to an artist who then executes the work is not,
on that ground alone, a joint author with the artist. Joint authorship
envisages the contribution of skill and labour to the production of the work
itself.”198 Thus, authorship, as defined by extraneous Australian copyright
law, obstructed the court from providing relief to the clan which owned the
images under indigenous customary law. If TCEs are being protected for the
benefit of indigenous communities, then they should be protected in the
manner those communities desire. Why then the need for extraneous
requirements?
In addition, efforts to satisfy extraneous requirements sometimes lead
to unintended consequences that defeat the goal of adequately protecting
TCEs. The creation of public databases199 containing protected information
is being considered to meet the requirement of notice—a Western legal
construct. These databases make public the secret and sacred information
contained within them.
Consequently, their existence leads to a
contemporaneous combustion of the sanctity of the information they seek to
protect, thereby defeating their purpose. Indigenous rights advocates have
called such processes “entirely wrong headed”—and appropriately so.200
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The adoption of customary law as the mechanism for the protection of
TCEs does pose certain challenges; nevertheless, they are not
insurmountable. The greatest objection to the use of indigenous customary
law concerns the challenges of achieving effective implementation.
However, implementation-related obstacles are not particular to indigenous
customary laws, and exist with other solutions as well. In fact, the
challenges posed are no more difficult to surmount than those posed by other
proposed regimes. A genuine desire to adopt indigenous customary laws and
the political will to do so can lead to effective implementation.
A.

Challenges to Executing an Effective Implementation of Indigenous
Customary Law Exist but They Are No More Difficult to Surmount
than Those Posed by Other Proposed Solutions

The effective implementation of indigenous customary law for the
protection of TCEs will face challenges; however, the challenges are at most
different, if not identical to, those posed by other proposed solutions, and not
necessarily more difficult to overcome. First, in order to comply with
indigenous customary laws, outsiders will need to ascertain the laws, which
may pose a challenge. However, certain sui generis solutions incorporate
aspects of indigenous customary laws and there too, an understanding of the
group’s laws is required.
A similar problem is presented with existing IPRs where, even outside
the spectrum of TCEs, an understanding of the laws is necessary and yet, is
not always achieved. Altering the scheme of protection to be based on
indigenous customary law simply reverses which group of people will need
to strive to understand the laws. Given that the intent of the law is to protect
the TCEs of indigenous peoples, it is not unfair to ask outsiders to carry
some of the burden of protection. Hence, the first challenge nets out when
compared to the other proposed solutions.
A second potential challenge to the implementation of indigenous
customary laws is that there is no means by which to enforce an international
regime of acceptance.201 At present, because there is no mechanism under
which indigenous customary law can be enforced internationally, it may
simply become a regional or state-specific solution. However, sui generis
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regimes have suffered the same fate.202 Thus, the use of indigenous
customary law at worst preserves the status quo when compared with sui
generis solutions.
A final potential challenge to the implementation of indigenous
customary law concerns whether it will be applicable to individuals outside
the indigenous community. Since indigenous customary law is already
incorporated in certain sui generis regimes, it is already applied in some
form to those outside the indigenous community. In addition, if unfamiliar
indigenous customary law is applied to outsiders to protect TCEs, it is no
different from applying unfamiliar existing IPRs to indigenous groups. A
concern about the applicability of indigenous customary laws to outsiders is
not founded on any stronger a basis than a reciprocal concern about the
application of existing IPRs to indigenous peoples.
B.

Indigenous Customary Law Can Be Effectively Implemented

Despite the existing challenges, an effective implementation of
indigenous customary law for the protection of TCEs can be attained. First,
solutions exist to educate outsiders about indigenous customary laws. One
illustrative mechanism would be to create a presumption that the use of
TCEs by outsiders is unauthorized unless explicit authorization is granted by
the community that owns the TCE. Thus, a user of a TCE will only be
expected to investigate the law particular to the use desired and will be
relieved of learning about all potentially applicable indigenous customary
laws. For instance, in Australia, parties wishing to use Aboriginal art would
have the burden of obtaining explicit authorization from the community to
which the artwork belongs. Thus, they will be in compliance with both the
indigenous customary law, as well as Australian copyright law. States can
also create education programs to disseminate information about appropriate
processes for the use of TCEs. Such a prospect may seem unwieldy at first.
However, its goal—achieving an understanding of indigenous customary
laws—is identical to getting a layman to understand basic copyright laws,
which is realistic and achievable. In fact, it has been argued that a lot can be
accomplished in this area through education and sensitization of people to
the issues, because people are generally willing to do the right thing.203
Second, the enforcement of indigenous customary laws across borders
can be achieved through the addition of appropriate provisions to the
applicable multinational agreements. The TRIPS agreement, which covers a
202
203
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broad range of intellectual property protections,204 permits states a certain
degree of freedom to implement particular policies within their borders,205
while still requiring them to meet certain agreed upon minimum
standards.206 A failure to comply with the agreement can lead to sanctions
by other states.207 An agreement similar to TRIPS, or a provision within
TRIPS, which permits state-specific implementation of indigenous
customary law while requiring that laws be respected across borders can
solve the cross-border implementation problem. Indigenous customary law
can then be comprehended with a state’s laws, and jurisdiction can be gained
within a state’s national courts. The implementation of TRIPS is
expensive.208 The implementation of indigenous customary laws within
TRIPS, or through a TRIPS-like agreement, will potentially also be
expensive. Hence, the political will to achieve implementation will be
necessary. Yet if an effective solution is to be achieved, such an approach
should be given serious consideration. In addition, if indigenous customary
laws can be imbued as the norm for protecting TCEs, then arguably their use
can be deemed a part of customary international law, and will be
enforceable. Consequently, a genuine desire to protect TCEs through use of
indigenous customary laws can lead to creative solutions that surmount
perceived challenges.
VII. CONCLUSION
Indigenous customary laws, when compared with existing IPRs and
sui generis solutions, more effectively protect the TCEs of indigenous
peoples and should be implemented. Indigenous peoples have the right to
“practice and revitalize their cultural traditions,” which includes the right to
“maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of
their cultures.”209 Indigenous customary law is law, and it has effectively
204
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protected the TCEs of indigenous communities. It is fallacious and limiting
to presume that existing IPRs, and the sui generis solutions based on them,
encompass all possible solutions when other viable options such as
indigenous customary laws exist. Existing IPRs and sui generis solutions
are based on a paradigm that is inapplicable to TCEs. Hence, they either fail
to encompass aspects of TCEs that should be protected, or impose needless
requirements that burden the process of protection to the extent that
protection is denied.
Challenges to the implementation of indigenous customary laws exist,
but they are not insurmountable and the solution itself should not be rejected
because of them. The challenges are either identical to, or no worse than
those posed by existing IPRs or sui generis solutions. Viable solutions to the
challenges do exist, and can be implemented with a genuine desire to protect
the TCEs of indigenous peoples.

